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1. INTRODUCTION
United States regulatory agencies often regulate or ban economic activi-
ties that are associated with minor risks, while delaying action or not
enforcing regulations for more hazardous activities. Environmental health
and safety standards change over time and differ across agencies or even
across programs controlled by the same agency in ways that appear
unrelated to the underlying scienti®c ``fundamentals.'' In many cases, the
pattern of regulatory response is one of overreaction to sensational acci-
dents and disasters Magat et al., 1986; Viscusi, 1992; Of®ce of Manage-
.ment and Budget, 1992; Wildavsky, 1995 .
The tendency of regulatory agencies to set inconsistent standards and to
overreact to random incidents is puzzling. Ef®ciency considerations suggest
that more injuries and premature deaths could be prevented if the strin-
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gency of regulatory standards were equalized across hazardous activities.
Occasional random accidents or disasters should be accepted as an in-
evitable by-product of economic trade-offs in the regulation of risk.
One explanation for this puzzle is founded on bounded rationality
 .Slovic et al., 1985 . Both casual introspection and a large body of experi-
mental evidence suggest that people are not fully rational Bayesians. Their
inferences are subject to cognitive biases that arise from the use of
suboptimal risk assessment heuristics; and they use heuristic rules-of-thumb
 .in processing new information Kahnemann et al., 1982 .
In particular, people tend to overestimate the frequency of low probabil-
ity events and underestimate the frequence of high probability events.
They also have little appreciation for the law of large numbers and tend to
overgeneralize from small, potentially unrepresentative, samples. One im-
plication would be the observed pattern of alarmist reactions toward
infrequently realized hazards, on the one hand, and relative indifference
toward frequently realized hazards on the other. Even if public policy
experts are aware of the nature of cognitive processes and can ``undo''
biases in their own risk assessments, they might be forced to go along with
the wishes of the public and its untrained intuitions.
Implicit in this view is the notion that citizens' preferences are more or
less directly translated into public policy. In fact, the preferences of the
public are mediated through political processes and institutions. It is
clearly of interest to examine whether political factors contribute indepen-
dently to the puzzling empirical regularities noted above.
This paper deals with the question whether the over- and underregula-
tion of hazardous activities may be due to some characteristics of the
political oversight process. The activities of regulatory agencies are typi-
cally not monitored in an ongoing fashion. Instead their political principals
}Congress, Congressional committees and subcommittees, the White
House}rely on external information ¯ows about the risks associated with
various regulated activities. These principals are regularly informed about
dramatic, well-publicized accidents and disasters as well as complaints ®led
by disaffected interest groups and constituents. Congress may respond to
such ``®re-alarm'' signals by engaging in oversight activities McCubbins
.and Schwartz, 1984 . It has access to a variety of budgetary and legislative
instruments of political control. Perhaps most important, Congress can
override expert judgments or decisions made by agencies, for example by
initiating new legislation or withdrawing funding for implementation. In
the case of executive branch agencies, the president may have the option
of dismissing agency appointees, or ``encouraging'' them to resign.
So far we have described one level of the political oversight process: the
principal]agent relationship between policymakers and regulators. An-
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other level is given by the principal]agent relationship between voters and
their elected representatives. These two levels of oversight resemble each
other in signi®cant ways. The primary instrument of oversight employed by
voters is dismissal: if they are dissatis®ed with their political representa-
tion, they can vote the incumbent out of of®ce. In some cases, voters have
access to another instrument of oversight: the referendum, which can be
used to overturn political decisions. Voters also have access to ®re-alarm
signals}speci®cally media reports, interest group communications, and, in
the case of elections, public statements made by challengers Lupia, 1992,
.1994 .
A more complex analysis would explicitly model this situation as a
two-level, or nested, principal]agent problem. For simplicity, we focus on
the principal]agent relationship between a policymaker and a regulator,
referring to the former as the principal, to the latter as the agent. We
examine the case in which the principal can override the agent's decision
or dismiss the agent in response to ®re-alarm signals. It should be
understood, however, that our analysis also applies to the principal]agent
relationship between voters and policymakers.
Two characteristics of the political oversight process are central to our
analysis. First, when delegation is motivated by differences in expertise or
costs of information gathering, the principal tends to be less well informed
than the agent. Even if the principal has access to low-cost ®re-alarm
signals, the information conveyed by the media, interest groups, and
constituents is often very simple in nature. As a consequence, the principal
tends to have a coarser information set than the agent. We formalize this
notion by assuming that the agent observes a continuous variable the
.probability that a hazard will occur if a hazardous activity is allowed , while
the principal only observes two binary pieces of information the agent's
decision to allow or prohibit the hazardous activity and a favorable or
.adverse ®re-alarm signal .
Second, political oversight instruments are simple relative to the com-
plexity of the regulatory environment. The principal's choice set is discrete:
she can make a binary choice between overturning the decision of an agent
and not doing so; or dismissing the agent and not doing so.
The principal's discrete choice set and the coarseness of her information
set are two important sources of regulatory bias. If the principal had access
to a richer set of signals or oversight instruments, she could ®ne-tune her
political control rule to ensure that the agent's behavior is more in line
with her objectives. Our analysis suggests that we should expect regulatory
inconsistency and overreaction to be pervasive, albeit without relying on
bounded rationality considerations. More speci®cally, low probability haz-
ards will tend to be overregulated, high probability hazards underregu-
lated.
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Other scholars have identi®ed two features of ®re-alarm oversight that
may prevent information pertinent to political decisions from being fully
aggregated. First, if there are multiple information providers and the
political alternatives under consideration have the characteristics of a
collective good, then the provision of costly informative signals is subject to
 .a free rider problem Lohmann, 1993 . Second, information providers
whose interests con¯ict with those of political decision makers may have
incentives to deceive the recipients of their signals Lohmann, 1993; Lupia,
.1992 . Our paper identi®es a third feature of ®re-alarm oversight that may
prevent the ``full-information outcome'' from being achieved: ®re-alarm
signals and oversight instruments are simple relative to the complexity of
the political environment. This third feature is of particular importance
because it addresses the logic of ®re-alarm oversight at its very core.
Fundamentally, ®re-alarm oversight makes sense in a complex environ-
ment where the acquisition of ``encyclopedic'' information is prohibitively
costly but low-cost ``information shortcuts'' are possible Lupia, 1994, p.
.63 .
This paper studies the regulatory implications of the political oversight
process by analyzing the equilibrium of a regulation game. Rather than
study a general formulation, we have chosen to keep this game as simple
as possible in order to make transparent the intuition underlying our
results. To this end, we abstract from many otherwise important features
of regulatory decision making and political oversight. While our model
lacks richness, its abstract nature allows us to isolate the role of simple
oversight instruments and coarse information ¯ows in creating regulatory
bias.
Section 2 develops a model of delegation in which the principal may
override the agent's regulatory decision. Section 3 modi®es the model to
analyze the situation in which the principal may dismiss the agent. Section
4 discusses various applications and extensions of our analysis.
2. DELEGATION WITH OVERRIDE
A society faces the regulatory decision to allow or prohibit a hazardous
activity.1 The activity generates some bene®ts for society. With some
positive probability, an adverse state of the world is realized. If the activity
is allowed and the state of the world is adverse, some members of the
society suffer costly health consequences. Otherwise, no costs are incurred.
1For simplicity, we restrict attention to the binary decision to allow or ban an activity
rather than consider the more general case in which a regulator can choose the stringency of
a regulatory standard.
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One example for the kind of regulatory decision we have in mind is
whether to approve a drug that promises to ®ght disease but may be
associated with negative side-effects. Another example is given by the
regulatory decision whether to allow a nuclear power plant to be built in
an area that may be prone to earthquakes.
We ®rst develop a two-period principal]agent model, in which the
political principal of a regulatory agency may overturn agency decisions.
The principal's utility in each period is given by
b if the activity is allowed and the state¡
of the world is favorable
P ~ 1 .b y c if the activity is allowed and the stateU s
of the world is adverse¢0 if the activity is prohibited,
where b are the bene®ts derived from allowing the members of the society
to engage in the hazardous activity, 0 F b F 1, and c are the costs then
incurred in the event of an adverse environment. Time subscripts are
.suppressed whenever possible to avoid notational clutter.
The ex ante probability that the adverse state of the world will be
realized is given by p , while the favorable state of the world is realized
 .with probability 1 y p . The probability p is drawn from a uniform
distribution on the interval from 0 to 1. The principal is imperfectly
informed about p .2 Furthermore, it is prohibitively costly for the principal
to acquire information about this probability. But she can costlessly
provide a regulatory agency with the apparatus and the expertise to
determine perfectly and costlessly the value of p . Since p is privately
observed by the agency, the principal lets the agency decide whether to
allow or prohibit the activity.3
Thus, we motivate delegation with the standard informational argument
 . Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991 . In practice, it is infeasible prohibitively
.costly for a political principal to acquire detailed information about the
incidence and severity of the hazards associated with various activities. The
2 The analysis could easily accommodate uncertainty about the bene®ts or the costs
associated with the activity.
3 We make these extreme assumptions for simplicity. The following assumptions are crucial.
First, the cost of setting up an agency is smaller than the difference between the expected
utility achieved by the policymaker when she sets regulatory policy on the basis of her diffuse
prior information and the expected utility achieved when she delegates regulatory powers to
an agency. Second, once the agency is set up, the principal and the agency face different costs
of information acquisition so that the agency forms a more precise estimate of the value of p .
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regulatory agency has a comparative advantage in acquiring information.
To the extent that the acquired information is private, perhaps due to its
technical complexity, the agency would be granted decision-making pow-
ers. Our model can also be reinterpreted as pertaining to the case in which
the agency makes an expert judgment whether to allow or prohibit the
activity, and the principal makes the actual decision.
The principal thus delegates the authority to allow or prohibit the
potentially hazardous activity to the regulatory agency, henceforth referred
to as the agent. The agent is chosen from an in®nite pool of candidates
whose utility in each period is given by
b q t if the activity is allowed and the state¡
of the world is favorable
t ~b q t y c if the activity is allowed and the stateU s 2 .
of the world is adverse¢0 if the activity is prohibited,
where t indexes the candidates' types.4
We specify a distribution of candidate types that is symmetric around
the principal's type. The agent's type t can take on one of three values,
with equal probabilities: T , 0, and yT. The parameter T re¯ects the
heterogeneity of the pool of candidates and is restricted to the range
 40 F T F min b, 1 y b . This restriction implies that b y T G 0 and b q T
F 1. We impose this restriction to preserve symmetry. If the distribution
of preferences were asymmetric relative to the principal's preferences, our
model would generate the implication that regulatory outcomes are biased.
We are interested in analyzing other, less obvious, sources of bias and do
not wish to confound the effects of various sources. In any case, we shall
seek to make transparent our use of this restriction in the derivation of
our results.
Without loss of generality, the costs c are normalized to 1.5 In the
absence of any other constraints, then, an agent whose bene®ts are given
by b q t allows the activity if the probability p lies below the cutpoint
4 The analysis can easily accommodate differences in the costs c or in the priors on p . The
assumption that the pool of agents is in®nite is made for technical reasons and is relevant
only for the model considered in Section 3, in which the agent may be dismissed: it allows us
to avoid the messy calculations involved when the distribution of agents in a ®nite pool
changes after one agent is chosen and some information about the agent's preferences is
revealed through his decisions.
5There is no loss of generality in normalizing the costs since the expected net bene®ts are
the crucial variable driving the analysis.
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b q t , and prohibits the activity otherwise. The value b q t will be
referred to as the agent's myopic cutpoint. The cutpoint of an agent of type
T is higher than the principal's cutpoint: the agent is willing to allow the
activity for a larger range of p than the principal would. An agent of type
0 has the same cutpoint as the principal. Finally, an agent of type yT has
a lower cutpoint: he is more ``cautious'' than the principal. The parameter
T thus captures the potential con¯ict of interest between the principal and
her agent.
If the principal were completely informed about the preferences of the
candidates in the pool, she would delegate power to an agent who is a
clone of herself, that is, an agent of type 0. In this case, the principal would
never have incentives to interfere with her agent's decisions. The oversight
problem becomes more interesting if the principal is incompletely in-
formed about the candidates' preferences. She knows the distribution of
their preferences, and in particular the parameter T , but she cannot
directly observe the preferences of any speci®c candidate.
At ®rst blush, it might appear implausible to assume that a political
principal is incompletely informed about the policy preferences of a
political appointee. It might be argued that the principal can form an
estimate of a candidate's policy preferences on the basis of personal
contact, past decisions, interest group ratings, and the like. In our view,
however, it is implausible to assume that the principal can form a perfect
estimate. By the very nature of the regulation of risk, new and unforeseen
hazards arise over time while others lose in importance. It is arguably
impossible for a principal to perfectly foresee how a given agent will
respond to all possible situations that might arise in the future. The
principal might have access to a pool of agents whose preferences are
known to be similar to her own, but there exists some residual uncertainty
about the future behavior of an agent drawn from this pool.
Another motivation for the incomplete information assumption is given
by the notion that the policy preferences of an agency are, at least in part,
``created'' by legislative mandates, agency organization, administrative pro-
 .cedures, and the external interest group environment of an agency
 .McCubbins et al., 1987, 1989 . For example, administrative procedures
in¯uence which external interest groups have low-cost access to the
agency, allowing them to bias agency decision making to their advantage.
Even if the principal designs administrative procedures to reduce ``agency
slack'' or ``political drift,'' there is arguably some residual uncertainty in
the workings of administrative procedures and the reactions of external
interest groups that cannot be ``designed away.''
We now turn to the political control problem. In practice, it is infeasible
for a political principal to monitor a regulatory agency in an ongoing
fashion, given the large number and technical complexity of regulatory
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standards. Indeed, the costs associated with perfect monitoring would
more than likely undo the bene®ts achieved by delegating in the ®rst place.
However, the media, interest groups, and constituents send ®re-alarm
signals to the principal that are informative about agency activities. We
assume that the principal can costlessly receive information about the state
of the world which has implications for the incidence of the hazards
. 6associated with the regulated activity . The ``®re-alarms'' in our model are
not strategic players; that is, their reports are assumed to be trustworthy.
Speci®cally, we assume that the principal observes the agent's decision
to allow or prohibit the activity and then receives a Good or Bad ®re-alarm
signal indicating that the state of the world is favorable or adverse.7 Thus,
the principal can distinguish the following four events. First, the agent
 .allows the activity, after which the Bad signal is observed aB . Second, the
 .activity is allowed, and the Good signal is realized aG . Third, the agent
 .prohibits the activity, and the Bad signal occurs pB . Fourth, the activity
 .is prohibited, and the Good signal is realized pG .
The primary goal of our analysis is to establish the conditions under
which regulatory outcomes will be biased in the following sense. We
calculate the ex ante probability that the activity is allowed given the
strategic interaction between the fully informed agent and the imperfectly
and incompletely informed principal; this probability is compared to the ex
ante probability b that a principal who is perfectly informed about p
would allow the activity. If the latter probability is lower, we de®ne the
activity to be overregulated; otherwise the activity is underregulated. Given
that the agent's preferences are in effect a random variable, over- and
underregulation will generally be pervasive ex post. In our view, it is of
greater interest to ask whether the regulatory process is systematically
biased in the ex ante sense described above.
In the model analyzed below, there are two potential sources of decision
bias. First, the agent could strategically modify his decision rule to reduce
the probability that his decision is overturned. Second, the principal's
decision rule might not be symmetric; that is, the principal might be more
likely to overturn the agent's decision if the agent allows the activity than
if the activity was prohibited, or vice versa.
The time sequence of events is as follows. In period 1, Nature draws the
agent's type t and the probability p that the state of the world is adverse.
The agent privately observes t and p . He decides whether to allow or
prohibit the activity. The adverse state of the world is realized with
 .probability p , the favorable state with probability 1 y p . After observing
6 The results would be robust if there were a small cost.
7The assumption of discrete information ¯ows is crucial for our analysis; the speci®c
 .assumption that the ®re-alarm signal is binary like the state of the world is made for
simplicity only.
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the agent's decision and the ®re-alarm signal Good if the state of the
.world is favorable, Bad if it is adverse , the principal decides whether to
maintain or overturn the agent's decision for the future. The players'
®rst-period payoffs are realized as a function of the agent's decision and
the state of the world. In period 2, the adverse state of the world is
 .realized with probability p , the favorable state with probability 1 y p .
The players' second-period payoffs are realized as a function of the agent's
and the principal's decisions and the state of the world.
The structure of the game is common knowledge. The equilibrium
concept employed is that of sequential equilibrium Kreps and Wilson,
.1982 .
We ®rst analyze the decision problem of the agent. Consider the
following myopic decision rule: the agent allows the activity if the probabil-
ity p lies below his myopic cutpoint b q t and prohibits it otherwise. By
following this rule, the agent gets his desired policy for sure in the ®rst
period. If he modi®es his strategy, he at best gets his desired policy in the
second period but at the cost of having an undesired policy in the ®rst
period. Because there are only two periods and total expected utility is
additive across these periods, the agent has nothing to gain by modifying
 .his behavior. This result would be reinforced with discounting. Hence,
the myopic decision rule is optimal.
Next, we analyze the principal's decision problem. The principal's deci-
sion to maintain or overturn the agent's decision does not affect her
®rst-period utility. Moreover, since the agent has no active role in the
second period, it does not matter whether the principal can or does dismiss
the agent after the ®rst period. For this reason, it is not the principal's
primary concern to form an update on the agent's type t . At the time of
her decision, she can only in¯uence whether the activity ends up being
allowed or prohibited in the second period. It also follows that the
.principal's decision is unaffected by discounting.
When assessing her second-period payoffs, the principal's primary con-
cern is to use the information that becomes available in the ®rst period to
 .form an estimate of the probability p which is constant across periods . If
she estimates p to exceed b, she makes sure that the activity is prohibited
in the second period; if she estimates p to lie below b, she lets the activity
be allowed. It follows that the principal overturns the agent's decision to
 < .allow the activity if her posterior expectation E p ? exceeds b; she
 < .overturns the agent's decision to prohibit the activity if E p ? lies below
b; otherwise she maintains the agent's decision. E is an expectations
.operator.
The principal solves a signal extraction problem in forming an update on
the probability p , based on the information conveyed by the agent's
decision and the ®re-alarm signal. The agent's decision depends on his
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type t and the probability p , and the realization of the signal about the
state of the world depends on the probability p .
Noting that there are three types of agents, Bayes' law implies that the
principal forms the update
byT b bqT
p dp q p dp q p dp 2H H H b T0 0 0E p N a s s q - b 3 .  .
b y T q b q b q T 2 3b .  .
1 1 1
p dp q p dp q p dpH H H
byT b bqTE p N p s .
1 y b y T q 1 y b q 1 y b q T .  .  .
1 q b T 2
s y ) b , 4 .
2 3 1 y b .
 4where the inequalities follows from the restriction T F min b, 1 y b .
The principal follows a no-regret o¨erride rule. Given the symmetric
distribution of the agent's possible types around the principal's type, it
 .  .  .  .obviously holds that E p N aG - E p N a and E p N pB ) E p N p . If the
information conveyed by the ®re-alarm signal appears to con®rm the
agent's decision}that is, when the decision to allow the hazardous activity
 .is followed by the Good signal aG , or the decision to prohibit the activity
 .is followed by the Bad signal pB }then the principal does not overturn
the agent's decision.
 .  .For the remaining outcomes, aB and pG , the signal counters the
agent's decision. After some tedious algebra one can show that
2 2w xsign b y E p N aB s sign b y 2T 5 .  .
2 2sign E p N pG y b s sign 1 y b y 2T . 6 .  .  .
 .  .In interpreting 5 and 6 we distinguish two cases: the low-conflict case in
which the potential con¯ict between the principal and her agent is weak,
   . 4.’ ’or T is low T F min b 1r2 , 1 y b 1r2 , and the high-conflict case in
  ’which the potential con¯ict is strong, or T is large T G max b 1r2 , 1 y
8. 4.’b 1r2 .
8    . 4The analysis of the intermediate case in which T g min b 1r2 , 1 y b 1r2 ,’ ’
  . 4.max b 1r2 , 1 y b 1r2 is more complex. In this case, the principal responds to the’ ’
1®re-alarm signal in an asymmetric way. For b ) , she overturns the agent's decision to allow2
the activity if the signal is Bad, whereas she never overturns the agent's decision to prohibit
1the activity; conversely, for b - , she overturns the agent's decision to prohibit the activity if2
the signal is Good, whereas she never overturns the agent's decision to allow the activity.
Here the source of regulatory bias is given by the principal's asymmetric response to the
 .®re-alarm signal. This case is analyzed in Hopenhayn and Lohmann 1996 .
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 .  .In the low-con¯ict case the expressions in 5 and 6 are positive so that
the principal would have no incentives to overturn the agent's decision. In
effect, the agent's preferences are so close to the principal's that the
principal trusts the information conveyed by the agent's decision more
than she trusts the information contained in the ®re-alarm signal. In the
extreme case of T s 0, the principal would obviously never have reason to
.overturn the decision of a clone of herself. Some minimal con¯ict of
interest is thus necessary to induce the principal to overturn the agent's
decision. In the high-con¯ict case, this happens if the agent's decision to
allow the activity is followed by the Bad signal, or if his decision to prohibit
the activity is followed by the Good signal.
Next, we examine the existence and direction of regulatory bias. Recall
that the myopic cutpoints of the three possible types, b y T , b, and b q T ,
 .are symmetric around b. Thus, the source of regulatory bias if any does
not lie with the agent's decision rule. Of course, if the agent is of type yT
or T , regulatory decision making is biased toward over- or underregulation
ex post. But the agent's decision rule is not systematically biased ex ante,
that is, on average across possible agent types. The ®rst-period decision
bias is zero.
In the second period, the principal never overturns the agent's decision
if the potential con¯ict with her agent is weak. In this case, the second-
period regulatory bias is also zero. Turning to the more interesting
high-con¯ict case, it is useful to recall that the activity is allowed in the
second period if either the agent allowed the activity in the ®rst period and
 .the Good signal occurred aG , in which case the agent's decision was not
overturned; or if the agent prohibited the activity in the ®rst period and
 .the Good signal was realized pG , in which case the principal overturned
the agent's decision. The probability that the activity is allowed in the
second period is thus equal to
1Pr aG j pG s Pr G s . 7 .  .  .2
The ex ante probability that a fully informed principal would have allowed
the activity is, however, equal to b. It immediately follows that there is a
1bias toward overregulation for b ) and toward underregulation for b2
1 1- . Only in the ``knife-edge'' symmetric case of b s is there no bias.2 2
The bias arises because the principal's choice set is discrete over-
.ride or don't override and the binary ®re-alarm signal observed by the
principal is coarse relative to the continuous signal observed by the agent.
The principal's no regret override rule is symmetric around one half. For
1b ) , the principal is more likely to overturn the agent's decision in the2
1 .  .event aB than in the event pG , and vice versa for b - .2
1 1These two situations, b ) and b - , can be associated with low and2 2
high probability hazards, respectively. Maintaining the assumption of a
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uniform distribution, an activity can be classi®ed as a low or high probabil-
ity hazard depending on the support of the distribution of the probability
p . So far we have assumed that this probability is drawn from a uniform
distribution on the interval from 0 to 1. Suppose instead that p is drawn
w xfrom a uniform distribution with support P, P , where 0 F P - P F 1.
For an agent whose utility is given by U s b q t y p , a simple change of
units
U b y P q t p y PÃU ' s y
P y P P y P P y P
obviously preserves the ranking of alternatives. Let
b y P t p y PÃb ' t ' and p ' .Ã Ã
P y P P y P P y P
Ã ÃThen the transformation U s b q t y p , with p distributed uniformly onÃ Ã Ã
the interval from 0 to 1, brings us back to the regulation problem analyzed
above. If we measure the riskiness of a project relative to its bene®ts, we
 .may say that an activity is a low probability hazard if P q P r2 - b
1Ã .  .equivalently, b ) and a high probability hazard if P q P r2 ) b2
1Ã .equivalently, b - .2
The model could be extended to allow for other asymmetries for
example, the number or variance of ®re-alarm signals might depend on the
.state of the world , with similar results. In conclusion, the override model
suggests that over- and underregulation will generally be pervasive and,
more speci®cally, that low probability hazards will tend to be overregu-
lated, high probability hazards underregulated.
3. DELEGATION WITH DISMISSAL
We now analyze a model in which the instrument of political oversight is
dismissal. The problem at hand is an application of the classic multi-armed
bandit problem Berry and Fristedt, 1985; see Banks and Sundaram, 1993,
.for an application to elections . After observing the agent's regulatory
decision and the realization of the ®re-alarm signal, the principal may
 .choose to replace the agent with a new random draw from the pool of
candidates. Now two types of bias can potentially arise: a decision bias
would emerge if the agent strategically modi®ed his decision rule to
increase his probability of survival. We show further below that the agent
is motivated to avoid dismissal even though his preferences are de®ned
.over policy only. In addition, a selection bias would obtain if the principal's
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dismissal rule implied a relatively higher survival probability for one of the
extreme agents, T or yT , than for the other one.
The time sequence of events is modi®ed as follows. In period 1, Nature
draws the ®rst-period agent's type t and the probability p that the state1 1
of the world is adverse in the ®rst period. The agent observes t and p .1 1
He decides whether to allow or prohibit the activity. The adverse state of
the world is realized with probability p , the favorable state with probabil-1
 . ity 1 y p . Based on the agent's decision and the ®re-alarm signal Good1
.if the state of the world is favorable, Bad if it is adverse , the principal
decides whether to dismiss the agent. The players' ®rst-period payoffs are
realized as a function of the agent's decision and the state of the world. In
period 2, if the ®rst-period agent was replaced, Nature draws the second-
period agent's type t ; otherwise t is equal to t . Nature also draws the2 2 1
probability p that the state of the world is adverse in the second period.2
The agent observes t and p . He decides whether to allow or prohibit the2 2
activity. The adverse state of the world is realized with probability p , the2
 .favorable state with probability 1 y p . The players' second-period pay-2
offs are realized as a function of the agent's decision and the state of the
world.
As before, the structure of the game is common knowledge, and the
equilibrium concept employed is that of sequential equilibrium.
The model is solved by backwards induction. Since the second-period
agent has the last move in the game, he follows his myopic optimal
decision rule. Thus, the activity is allowed in the second period if the
probability p lies below the agent's myopic cutpoint b q t , and prohib-2 2
ited otherwise.
Turning to the principal's decision problem, it is worthwhile emphasizing
an important difference between the override model and the dismissal
model. In the override model, the probability that the state of the world is
adverse, p , was assumed constant across periods, and the agent t had no
active role in the second period. Thus, the principal's primary concern was
to form an estimate of p , with the goal of deciding whether to override the
agent's decision. In the dismissal model, the second-period probability that
the state of the world is adverse, p , is a ``fresh draw,'' and the second-1
period agent t plays an active role. For this reason, the ®rst-period2
probability p , per se, is irrelevant for the principal's decision. Instead, the1
principal's signal extraction problem is geared toward forming an update
on the ®rst-period agent's type t based on the information conveyed by1
the agent's decision and the ®re-alarm signal, with the goal of deciding
whether to replace the ®rst-period agent with a ``fresh draw.'' The agent's
decision depends on his type t and the probability p , and the signal1 1
depends on the probability p .1
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The principal follows a no-regret dismissal rule analogous to the no-re-
gret override rule employed in the high-con¯ict case of the previous
model.9 That is, she dismisses the agent if the ®re-alarm signal counters
 .  .  .the agent's decision, aB or pG ; otherwise she keeps the agent, aG or
 .pB . We show further below that this dismissal rule is optimal given the
®rst-period agent's decision rule.
We now turn to the ®rst-period agent's decision problem. An agent of
type t employs the decision rule characterized by the cutpoint t ; this1
strategic cutpoint generally differs from the myopic cutpoint b q t . The1
agent trades off his ®rst-period preferred choice with maximizing his
chances of survival in order to achieve his preferred outcome in the second
period. Employing the cutpoint rule t , his probability of survival is given
by
t 1 1S t s 1 y p dp q p dp s q t 1 y t . 8 .  .  .  .H H 2
0 t
The agent's two-period expected utility from following the cutpoint rule t
is given by
t 1t t t1 1 1E U q U N t s b q t y p dp q q t 1 y t V , 9 .  .  . . H1 2 1 2
0
where Vt1 is the value of remaining in of®ce for an agent of type t . This1
continuation value is derived from the fact that an agent prefers himself or
a clone of himself to make the second-period regulatory decision. If he is
dismissed, the probability that he will be replaced by an agent with
2different preferences is equal to . Interestingly, the agent's survival3
incentives are derived from his policy goals. Our results would be strength-
ened if we assumed that the agent cared about avoiding dismissal per se in
addition to caring about the policy consequences of his dismissal.
The ®rst-order condition for the agent's maximization problem is given
by
t t1 1­ E U q U N t .1 2 t 1s b q t y t q 1 y 2t V s 0. 10 .  .1­t
The term b q t y t re¯ects the net bene®ts from allowing the activity in1
t1 .the ®rst period, while the term 1 y 2t V captures the expected bene®ts
9 1w  .xHere we restrict attention to the set of b g b, 1 y b , 0 - b - . The Appendix derives2
other, more complex, cases involving randomized dismissal strategies. The results are qualita-
tively similar.
LOHMANN AND HOPENHAYN236
 .of survival. Equation 10 implies that
1sign t y b q t s sign y b q t . 11 .  .  .1 12
1 .Intuitively, the probability of survival S t peaks at t s . For strategic2
reasons, the agent's cutpoint moves away from his myopic optimum b q t 1
1toward .2
The two extreme agents T and yT have a stronger of®ce motivation
than does the moderate agent 0. Each extreme agent may be replaced by
an extreme agent of the other kind, whose preferences are very much
different from his own. In contrast, the moderate agent may be replaced by
one of the extreme agents whose preferences are closer to his own. Due to
the symmetric distribution of the agents' preferences, the extreme agents'
survival incentives are identical in strength. In summary, the agents'
continuation values are ordered as follows:
V T s VyT ) V 0 ) 0. 12 .
Since the extreme agents have identical incentives to remain in of®ce, a
 .bias if any will not be caused by an asymmetry in the agents' continuation
values.
The incumbent agent in the ®rst period now faces a trade-off. If he
follows his myopic decision rule, he maximizes his ®rst-period utility. By
strategically modifying his decision rule, he can improve his chances of
survival and thereby increase his second-period expected utility. The
optimal cutpoint for an agent of type t ,1
b q t q Vt1 .1
t s , 13 .t11 q 2V
lies between the agent's myopic cutpoint and the survival maximizing
1cutpoint, :2
1 1b q t ) t ) for b q t ) 14 .1 12 2
1 1b q t - t - for b q t - . 15 .1 12 2
Given the agents' equilibrium decision rules, it remains to be shown that
the principal's no-regret dismissal rule is optimal. The optimal dismissal
.rule is formally derived in the Appendix. Due to the symmetry of the
candidates' preferences, the principal is indifferent between allowing an
agent of type T or yT to survive. Hence, the principal's objective is to
maximize the probability than an agent of type 0 is in power in the second
period. The probability that a random draw from the pool of candidates is
1of type 0 is equal to . If the posterior probability that the ®rst-period3
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1agent is of type 0 is greater than , the principal will choose to keep the3
agent; otherwise the ®rst-period agent is replaced with a random draw
from the pool.
The principal's posterior estimates of the probability that the ®rst-period
agent is of type 0 are given by
1Pr t s 0 N aB - 16 .  .1 3
1Pr t s 0 N aG ) 17 .  .1 3
1Pr t s 0 N pB ) 18 .  .1 3
1Pr t s 0 N pG - . 19 .  .1 3
Thus, the principal dismisses the agent if the agent allows the activity and
 .the Bad signal is realized aB , or if the agent prohibits the activity and the
 .Good signal is realized pG ; otherwise she keeps the agent.
The model is analyzed for two types of bias: decision bias and selection
bias. In the ®rst period, a decision bias arises if the average strategic
cutpoint across possible agent types is not equal to b. The second-period
outcome is subject to a selection bias if one of the extreme agents has a
higher probability of survival than the other one.
1Consider ®rst the ``knife-edge'' symmetric case of b s . The moderate2
1agent's myopic cutpoint is equal to , which is also the survival-maximizing2
1cutpoint. It follows that the moderate agent's optimal cutpoint is equal to 2
w  .xsee 13 . The strategic cutpoints of the two extreme agents are symmetric
1 w  .xaround see 13 . Thus, the ®rst-period decision bias is zero. The2
w  .xprobability of survival is identical for the two extreme agents see 8 . As a
consequence, the second-period agent's myopic cutpoint is, on average
across possible types, equal to b. It follows that the second-period selec-
tion bias is also zero.
1Next, consider the asymmetric case of b ) . The moderate agent's2
myopic cutpoint is equal to b, but he strategically modi®es his decision
1rule such that his cutpoint moves toward . That is, he now prohibits the2
activity for a larger range of realizations of p in order to increase his1
probability of survival. The cutpoints of the extreme agents also shift
1toward . On average, the two extreme agents behave more conservatively:2
t1T q yT 1 y 2b V 1 . .
y b s - 0 for b ) . 20 .t12 1 q 2V 2
Thus, the average cutpoint t across possible agent types lies below b if
1b ) : a ®rst-period decision bias toward overregulation obtains.2
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1Moreover, in the case of b ) an agent of type yT faces a more2
advantageous trade-off in the ®rst period than does an agent of type T ,
1 since yT 's myopic cutpoint lies closer to . Our statements regarding the2
1selection bias are limited to the case in which b y T F F b q T. The2
.derivation of other cases is straightforward. As a consequence, he has a
higher survival probability than does his counterpart. On average across
possible agent types, the second-period agent's myopic cutpoint lies below
1b in the second period if b ) : there is a second-period selection bias2
toward overregulation.
1The derivation and intuition for the case of b - follows straightfor-2
wardly. In this case, we obtain a ®rst-period decision bias and a second-
period selection bias toward underregulation.
In conclusion, the dismissal model suggests that over- and underregula-
tion will generally be pervasive. Moreover, as before we can equate the
1 1cases b ) and b - with low and high probability hazards, respectively,2 2
with the result that for low probability hazards there is a ®rst-period
decision bias and a second-period selection bias toward overregulation,
whereas for high probability hazards the decision and selection biases
favor underregulation.
Regulatory biases arise because the principal's choice set is discrete
 .dismiss or don't dismiss and the binary ®re-alarm signal observed by the
principal is coarser than the continuous signal observed by the agent. The
1 1principal's no-regret dismissal rule is symmetric around . For b ) the2 2
 .principal is more likely to dismiss the agent in the event aB than in the
1 .event pG ; and vice versa for b - . This asymmetric political control2
rule leads to a selection bias: regulatory policy is biased because certain
types of agents are more likely to survive. In addition, the principal's
asymmetric dismissal rule creates asymmetric incentives for different agent
types to strategically modify their behavior in order to increase their
probability of survival, thereby giving rise to a decision bias.
4. DISCUSSION
Two characteristics of the political oversight process are central to our
analysis: simple instruments of political oversight and coarse information
¯ows. These features generally give rise to asymmetric decision or selec-
tion rules that lead to decision or selection biases in regulatory decision
making.
A natural extension of our model would analyze the generation of
information by interested parties Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992;
. Lohmann, 1993 . When the policy in question is a possibly differ-
DELEGATION AND THE REGULATION OF RISK 239
.entiated-bene®ts public good, costly communication about policy conse-
quences is subject to a free rider problem. Policy biases might arise when
the incentives to generate Good and Bad signals, respectively, are asym-
metric.
Empirically, the framework explored in our paper might serve to orga-
nize our thinking about the evidence presented in informal case studies.
For example, drug approval decisions made by the Food and Drug Admin-
 .istration FDA appear to be subject to a decision bias toward overregula-
tion because of asymmetric ®re-alarm signals:
There are two types of errors the FDA can make in reviewing a new drug
application: it can approve a drug that turns out to have unexpectedly adverse
side effects, or it can delay or deny a bene®cial drug. From a public health
standpoint, both of these errors can be equally deadly, but from a political
standpoint, they are worlds apart. Incorrectly approving a drug can produce
highly visible victims, highly emotional news stories, and heated congressional
hearings. . . . Incorrectly delaying a drug, on the other hand, will produce invisi-
ble victims and little more. . . . Not surprisingly, the FDA's fundamental ap-
proach to drug approval is designed to reduce the likelihood of the ®rst type of
error while paying little attention to the second. The well-documented result of
this excessive caution is drug lag}the frequent unavailability of major new
 .drugs. . . Kazman, 1991, p. 5
 .Kelman's 1980 analysis suggests that Occupational Safety and Hazard
 .Administration OSHA decision making is subject to a selection bias
toward overregulation:
In determining the content of regulations, OSHA decision makers have usually
chosen more protective over less protectives alternatives}especially in some of
the more dramatic decisions the agency has made. . . . The evidence suggests
that the most important factor explaining OSHA decisions on the content of
regulations has been the pro-protective values of agency of®cials, derived from
the ideology of the safety and health professional and the organizational
 .mission of OSHA. Kelman 1980, p. 248
Ironically, our analysis suggests that the selection bias observed by Kelman
is precisely due to the features of the political oversight process that lead
him to reject the hypothesis that OSHA decision making is shaped by
political oversight:
An important alternative explanation remains: what about `political' factors in
OSHA's decisions about the content of regulations?. . . The most important
barrier to White House in¯uence over agency decision making is the fact that
time is ®nite. Although the capacity of the president himself and of the
`institutionalized presidency' the White House Staff and the Of®ce of Manage-
.ment and Budget to work endless hours is legendary, it is far outstripped by
the stupendous number of important issues with which agencies deal. . . . Lack
of time also means that intervention, when and if it comes, tends to come late
in a drawn-out decision-making process and to be based on fragments of
information rather than lengthy consideration that agency of®cials have given
 .the question. It is `crisis-oriented.' Kelman, 1980, p. 250, pp. 253]254
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Clearly, the framework developed in this paper is highly exploratory and
stylized. We have abstracted from the role of the tort system that provides
disincentives for ®rms to engage in activities with excessively adverse
health consequences for their workers, consumers, or the public at large.
Firm liability is a close substitute for government regulation. Our analysis
is partial in the sense that the overall effect of biases in regulatory policy
also depends on whether they offset or exacerbate the biases inherent in
an imperfect liability system.
Our analysis is incomplete in yet another respect: we do not examine
possible political responses to regulatory bias. The principal could ``debias''
regulatory policy by designing an employment contract that provides
counteracting incentives for the agent. In political settings, however,
employment contracts tend to be very simple, providing only ``low-powered''
 .incentives Tirole, 1994 . More plausibly, the principal might undo the
regulatory bias by deliberately delegating authority to an agent with
different preferences Rogoff, 1985; Melumad and Mookherjee, 1989;
.Fershtman et al., 1991 . A debiasing effect can also be achieved through
procedural design. For example, the principal might make it more costly
for the agent to pursue one path of action rather than another by requiring
that the agent perform a costly cost]bene®t analysis under certain circum-
stances; or by constraining the agent to follow stringent procedures in
some cases, while granting him considerable discretion in others McCub-
.bins et al., 1987, 1989 .
APPENDIX
Allowing for randomization, the principal's dismissal rule is given by the
 4vector l , e g aB, aG, pB, pG , where l is the probability that the agente e
 .survives is not dismissed if event e occurs. The following proposition
summarizes the optimal dismissal rule.
1  .PROPOSITION. There exists a ¨alue b, with 0 - b - , such that: i if2
w  .xb g b, 1 y b then the unique equilibrium is characterized by l s l saG pB
 . w .1 and l s l s 0; ii if b g 0, b then 0 - l y l - 1 and l sa B pG aG pG pB
 .  x1, with l y l uniquely determined; iii if b g 1 y b, 1 then 0 - laG pG pB
y l - 1 and l s 1, with l y l uniquely determined.a B aG pB a B
Proof. The proof of the proposition involves the following steps.
 .  .i Establish that the agents' decision rules allow or prohibit are
 4characterized by cutpoint values t , t g yT , 0, T .
 .ii Show that the corresponding cutpoints satisfy yT- 0 - T.
 .iii Derive the properties given in the proposition.
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 4LEMMA 1. There exist cutpoints, t , t g yT , 0, T such that agent t 1
allows the acti¨ ity iff p F t . Furthermore, yT- 0 - T.1
Proof. For agent t , the difference between the expected bene®ts of1
allowing the activity and the expected bene®ts of prohibiting the activity
are given by
G t , p ' b q t q l y l Vt1 .  .1 1 1 aG pG
t1y p 1 q l q l y l y l V . .1 aG pB a B pG
1t1  .  .It is easy to verify, ®rst, that V - G t , p - so that G t , p is1 1 1 12
 .  .strictly decreasing in p , and, second, that G t , 0 ) 0 and G t , 1 - 0.1 1 1
 .Let t be the unique value such that G t , t s 0. Agent t allows the1 1
 .activity iff p F t . From the de®nition of G t , p it is straightforward to1 1 1
verify that t is increasing in b q t .1
The following lemma characterizes some properties of the posterior
distributions on the agent's type. We develop only one of the posterior
distributions here since the remaining ones follow immediately. The poste-
 .rior Pr t N aB satis®es1
0
p dpH
0Pr t s 0 N aB s .1 yT0 T
p dp q p dp q p dpH H H
0 0 0
0
p dpH
0s . A1 .
0 T 0
3 p dp q p dp y p dpH H H
0 0 yT
1 .The agent is not removed iff Pr t s 0 N aB G , the unconditional1 3
 .probability of type 0 in the pool of agents. Equation A1 immediately
T 0implies that this inequality holds iff H p dp F H p dp . Applying a0 yT
similar argument, the following lemma is proved.
LEMMA 2. The posterior probabilities satisfy the following inequalities:
T1 0 .  .i Pr t s 0 N aB G iff H p dp F H p dp ;1 3 0 yT
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T1 0 .  .  .  .ii Pr t s 0 N aG G iff H 1 y p dp F H 1 y p dp ;1 3 0 yT
T1 0 .  .iii Pr t s 0 N pB G iff H p dp G H p dp ;1 3 0 yT
T1 0 .  .  .  .iv Pr t s 0 N pG G iff H 1 y p dp G H 1 y p dp .1 3 0 yT
1 1 .  .  . COROLLARY. i Pr t s 0 N aB - m Pr t s 0 N pB ) , and Pr t1 1 13 3
1 1.  . s 0 N aB s m Pr t s 0 N pB s ; similar properties hold for Pr t s1 13 3
1.  .  .  .  .0 N aG and Pr t s 0 N pG ; ii Pr t s 0 N aB G « Pr t s 0 N aG1 1 13
1 1 1 .  .  .) ; iii Pr t s 0 N pG G « Pr t s 0 N pB ) .1 13 3 3
Lemma 2 and the Corollary signi®cantly restrict the type of equilibria
that can arise. These restrictions are summarized in the following lemma.
 .LEMMA 3. The equilibrium dismissal rule satisfies: i if l - 1, thenaG
 .  .l s 0 and l s 1; ii if l - 1, then l s 0 and l s 1; iii ifa B pB pB pG aG
l ) 0, then l s 0, and, con¨ersely, if l ) 0, then l s 0.pG a B a B pG
Proof. The Lemma is an immediate consequence of the Corollary.
Note that Lemma 3 implies that at least one of the no-dismissal
 .probabilities l , l is equal to 1, while at least one of the no-dismissalaG pB
 .probabilities l , l is zero. A comprehensive and exclusive list ofa B pG
candidate equilibria is given by:
 .a l s l s 1; l s l s 0;aG pB a B pG
 .b l s l s 1; l ) 0; l s 0;aG pB a B pG
 .c l s l s 1; l ) 0; l s 0;aG pB pG a B
 .d l s 1; l - 1; l s 0; l G 0;aG pB pG a B
 .e l - 1; l s 1; l s 0; l G 0.aG pB a B pG
The ®rst item in the list is the only possible equilibrium that does not
involve randomization. The unique equilibrium is of this type provided b is
1not too far from . Otherwise, the equilibrium is mixed, and a source of2
indeterminacy arises, which we now discuss.
T  .Suppose there exists an equilibrium characterized by H 1 y p dp s0
0  .  .  .H 1 y p dp . Since this implies that Pr t s 0 N aG s Pr t s 0 N pG1 1yT
1s , l and l are not restricted. The cutpoint rule t satis®esaG pG3
b q t q l y l Vt1 .1 aG pG
t s , A2 .t11 q l y l q l y l V .aG pG pB a B
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 .  4 where A2 must hold for t g yT , 0, T . This equation restricts l yaG
.l but not the individual components, hence an indeterminacy arises.pG
0TSimilar remarks can be made for l and l when H p dp s H p dp .pB a B 0 yT
We now establish that aside from this indeterminacy the equilibrium is
unique and that there exist well-de®ned bounds for b that de®ne the
regions separating the different types of equilibrium described above.
0T  .  .The condition H 1 y p dp s H 1 y p dp can be rewritten as0 yT
T 1 y Tr2 q yT 1 y yTr2 0 . .
s 0 1 y . A3 . /2 2
 .  .To analyze equilibria of types c and e , de®ne
x
R x ' x 1 y .  /2
b q lV
p l, V , b ' and W l, V , b ' R p l, V , b . .  .  .
1 q 1 q l V .
 .Letting l ' l y l , noting that l s 1 and l s 0, and usingaG pG pB a B
 .  .A2 , after some calculations we can rewrite A3 as follows:
T 2
0 TW l, V , b y W l, V , b q s 0. A4 .  .  .2T2 1 q 1 q l V .
Since V 0 - V T, a necessary condition for this equality to hold is that
­ Wr­ V ) 0. But since ­ Rr­p s 1 y p ) 0, this condition is equivalent
 . w  .xto 0 - sign ­pr­ V s sign l y b 1 q l . For this inequality to hold, it
 .must be the case that b - lr 1 q l , which in particular implies that
b - 1r2.
The following lemma will be used to establish the conditions under
 .which A4 is satis®ed.
LEMMA 4. W ) 0 and, for b F 1r2, W - 0.12 23
Proof. The proof involves tedious calculations and is available from the
second author upon request.
 .Lemma 4 implies that the left-hand side of A4 is strictly increasing in
l and, in particular, that this expression is maximized at l s 1 and
minimized at l s 0. A straightforward calculation shows that this expres-
sion is negative at l s 0. Lemma 4 also implies that the left-hand side of
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 .A4 is strictly decreasing in b. It follows that this expression is maximized
 .at b s 0. Lengthy and tedious calculations establish that, at l s 1, A4
becomes positive as b goes to zero. Using these results, we may prove:
1 .  .LEMMA 5. For each G ) 0, there exists a ¨alue b G , with 0 - b G - ,2
 . w  .   ..xsuch that: i if b g b G , 1 y b G then the unique equilibrium is of type
 .  . w  ..  .  .a ; ii if b g 0, b G then the equilibria are of types d and e , depending
on the specific choices of l and l , with l y l ) 0 uniquelyaG pG aG pG
 .   .. x  .determined; iii if b g 1 y b G , 1 then the equilibria are of types b and
 .d depending on the specific choices of l and l , with l y l ) 0pB a B pB a B
uniquely determined.
 .  .Proof. Parts i and ii follow directly from the above remarks. Part
 .iii is obtained by noting that
b q t q l y l Vt1 .1 pB a B
1 y t s 1 y
t11 q l y l q l y l V .aG pG pB a B
 .so that 1 y t and 1 y b q t take the place of t and b q t in the1 1
above derivation.
NOMENCLATURE
U P principal's one-period utility
b bene®ts of activity if allowed
c costs of activity if it is allowed and state of world
is adverse
p probability that state of world is adverse
Ut one-period utility of agent of type t
 4t g T , 0, yT agent type t taking on one of three values: T , 0,
or yT
T parameter capturing strength of con¯ict of inter-
est between principal and agent
 . aB event agent allows activity and Bad signal is
.realized
 . aG event agent allows activity and Good signal is
.realized
 . pB event agent prohibits activity and Bad signal is
.realized
 . pG event agent prohibits activity and Good signal is
.realized
E expectations operator
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w xP, P support of distribution of probability p after
change of units
Ã  .  .b ' b y P r P y P bene®ts after change of units
 .t ' tr P y P agent type after change of unitsÃ
 .  .p ' p y P r P y P probability that state of world is adverse afterÃ
change of units
Ãt ÃU ' b q t y p one-period utility of agent of type t after changeÃ Ã Ã
of units
subscript 1 index for ®rst-period values
subscript 2 index for second-period values
t1  .e.g., U second-period utility U of agent appointed in2 2
 .®rst period t 1
 4t g T , 0, yT allowrprohibit cutpoint for agent of type t ,1
taking on value T for agent of type T , 0 for
agent of type 0, and yT for agent of type yT
 .S probability that agent survives is not dismissed
t1  T 0 yT 4V g V , V , V continuation value for agent of type t taking on1
value V T for agent of type T , V 0 for agent of
type 0, and VyT for agent of type yT
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